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Executive Summary 
 
One of the expectations accompanying electric utility deregulation was an increase in 
opportunities to purchase power directly from renewable resources.  Renewable power purchases 
require actual power delivery in contrast to purchases of renewable energy credits (RECs).  
RECs represent the environmental attributes of electricity produced from renewable energy 
sources and are often sold separately from commodity electricity.  RECs are simply certificates 
that verify they are backed up by power that was produced from a renewable resource 
somewhere.  RECs do not require physical power transmission, power billing, or other utility 
services. The ability to purchase renewable power was expected to provide Federal agencies with 
a much broader range of options to meet Congressional, Administration, and agency renewable 
energy objectives.  It also held out the promise of being able to use the buying power of the 
government to negotiate more favorable terms.  While the emerging REC market has become a 
vital tool for Federal agencies, purchasing renewable power has turned out to be more 
complicated than expected.  This paper describes some of the challenges Federal agencies have 
had purchasing renewable power as a means to meet renewable energy objectives established by 
Congress, the Administration, and their agencies. 
 
The ability to purchase renewable power sits within the broader context of utility regulation, 
energy market deregulation, and the transition of the electric utility industry that is underway in 
response to the changing energy marketplace, global climate change, and associated policies.  In 
brief, prior to industry deregulation, retail electricity customers were unable to choose the source 
of power supplies or suppliers.  Instead, they were served by a “system mix” of power resources.  
On a national average basis, these were predominately non-renewable resources fueled by coal, 
uranium, natural gas, and fuel oil, although a significant fraction of the Nation’s power was 
derived from large scale hydropower projects, a renewable resource.   
 
The deregulation of electric utilities is proceeding on two levels.  The first is deregulation of 
wholesale power supply markets and associated transmission.  This provides access for 
wholesale power customers to power resources and wholesale power customers across a large 
regional market.  Wholesale power customers include utilities, power marketers, and retail power 
providers that are authorized to resell power directly to retail customers.  This generally excludes 
retail power customers provided with power delivery services by local utilities.  Wholesale 
deregulation is under the jurisdiction of the Federal government and extends across the 
continental U.S., excluding most of Texas, which follows Federal practices using state 
authorities.  In contrast, retail deregulation is under the jurisdiction of each state and is 
proceeding on a state-by-state basis.  It currently extends to only half the lower-48 states, and is 
being reconsidered in several of these.  Retail deregulation does allow retail customers to 
purchase renewable power if they wish; however, the rules for doing so vary across the 
deregulated states. 
 
The complexity of retail deregulation and its limited scope have frustrated widespread use of 
renewable power procurements by Federal agencies.  In addition, Federal authorities to procure 
power competitively and state regulation of aggregation of purchases across customers have 
limited the ability of agencies to use their purchasing power in ways they anticipated.  
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Unfamiliarity with competitive power procurements has also slowed the contracting process for 
renewable power.  This paper provides a review of major Federal electricity procurement 
authorities and how they have been used in selected cases to procure renewable power.  For most 
of these cases, the process has been unsuccessful; nevertheless, each case provides useful lessons 
to modify and improve the process until success is realized.  Federal acquisition of RECs has not 
confronted the same barriers as renewable power procurements and has been highly successful, 
with the Federal government leading recent national lists of REC purchasers.  Potential ways to 
address renewable power procurement goals using RECs to increase Federal participation in 
renewable power markets is also discussed in the paper. 
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Introduction 
 
Procuring renewable power for Federal facilities seems like it should be relatively easy in 
today’s competitive wholesale power markets and utility deregulation.  However, this is 
not the case.  There are many reasons for this.  Some have to do with the nature and 
structure of the electric utility industry, such as:  
 
• how electricity is produced 
• how energy trades in competitive wholesale markets 
• how new power projects are financed 
• how competitive retail markets work and where they are available 
• what options are available to retail customers in non-deregulated areas. 
 
And some reasons have to do with the way Federal agencies are budgeted and how 
utilities are procured, such as:   
 
• the nature of how retail electric service is used at Federal sites 
• acquisition authorities 
• procurement practices 
• the role of budget adequacy and certainty in procurement decisions. 
 
As this host of reasons illustrate, the underlying issues are complex.  Further, they vary 
across agencies and state boundaries.  This document is a high level summary that 
examines these complexities of directly purchasing renewable generation at retail 
locations and provides examples of different retail supply arrangements that currently 
exist at Federal sites.  It also provides an overview of renewable power procurement 
challenges, many of which are specific to Federal agencies.   
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How Electricity is Produced 
 
The difference between renewable energy and a renewable energy credit (REC) is basic 
to this paper.  Central to that difference is how power is produced and delivered to retail 
customers, including how the power flows from generators to customers and how the 
financial transaction that covers those costs is processed.  A couple of useful adages can 
be used to describe both.  The first is that power flows like water: It seeks its own level, 
or alternatively, follows the path of least resistance.  The second is that money flows in 
the opposite direction from energy.  In reality, the correlation between the two is 
imperfect.   
 
In a simplified market with one generator and one customer, power flows from the 
generator to the customer.  In the real world, there are many generators and many 
customers.  To minimize the number of power lines connecting generators to customers, 
the generators connect to a transmission grid, which is a complex network of power lines 
and substations of various voltages.  Extending the plumbing analogy, the power system 
is similar to a municipal water supply that comes from reservoirs fed by many water 
sources.  Because energy is not stored like water in a reservoir, energy to your home may 
not come from the closest power plant, but from one hundreds of miles away.  As a 
result, power at the outlet originates from multiple sources, where the sources themselves 
and the contribution of each to the end user’s outlets is unknown.  This surprises some 
people, but it makes both engineering and economic sense.   
 
Although the real power system is composed of many generators and customer loads, 
because it is a closed system, the electrical reality is similar to the one generator, one 
customer analogy.  In other words, all energy produced in the system flows from 
generators to end uses.  This is a simplification because some energy is “lost” in the 
process of transmitting the power through the grid.  The financial reality is a similar 
closed system, because production is known, as are sales.  As a result, as long as 
generators are paid for their output by consumers, it doesn’t really matter where the 
power flows in the closed system.  The generator’s costs are allocated to individual 
customers through markets and utility rates. When consumers pay their power bills, their 
money flows back to the owners of the utility, transmission lines, and generators, 
opposite the way it came.  This greatly simplifies the financial aspect of the power 
business because generators and consumers only need to be concerned with how much 
they produced or consumed, not where the energy went or where it came from.  Exactly 
how the energy flows from the power plant to the consumer is irrelevant.  However, this 
situation changed when utilities and retail customers began to rely on energy purchased 
from specific power suppliers and specific generating sources. 
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How Power Costs and Customer Demand are Matched Up 
 
Power projects have two primary sets of costs: construction and associated financing, and 
fuel and ongoing operations and maintenance (O&M).  Different types of power plants 
have different but characteristic construction costs.  Similarly, they have characteristic 
fuel and O&M costs, which make up a different fraction of power production costs for 
each type of plant.  For example, renewable power plants have high initial construction 
costs but low fuel and O&M costs.  In contrast, natural-gas-fired power plants have 
relatively low construction costs, but fuel costs vary with the price of natural gas, which 
is currently very high.  Different power plants also have different operating 
characteristics.  Coal and nuclear power plants run most efficiently if they are operated 
near maximum capacity.  Similarly, wind farms only produce power when the wind 
blows; therefore, they need to run whenever they can.  Plants that operate best under 
unique circumstances are called “must run” plants, which include both nuclear plants and 
wind farms.  In contrast, the efficiency of a natural gas power plant is less sensitive to 
changes in output and is typically operated to provide power during peak demand periods 
and to respond to normal variations in demand.   
 
Prior to deregulation, most power was produced by the utility to serve the needs of its 
captive customers.  Utilities chose power plants based on projected need for base load or 
peaking power, and estimated life-cycle costs based on assumed construction, financing, 
and fuel costs.  Regulators permitted utilities to recover these costs through utility rates.  
When a new power plant was needed, the costs were rolled into rates by averaging the 
new plant costs in with the costs of all the other existing power plants.  This is called 
“average cost pricing.”  Under regulation, utility costs are known, customer demand is 
metered, and the utility’s costs are prorated to customers based on their consumption 
practices.  Because all costs are accounted for by the utility, allocation of the specific 
costs for transmission and each generator do not need to be precise.   
 
One reason some states opted to open up the power supply portion of electric markets to 
competition was that serious errors were made by utilities and regulators in their 
assumptions of power plant construction, financing, and fuel costs.  When the new higher 
cost resources were added to the generation mix, it resulted in substantially higher rates 
in some regions of the country, in what has been referred to as “rate shock.”  
Deregulation was adopted to take generation acquisition decisions out of the hands of 
regulators and monopolist utilities, thereby allowing that need to be met through 
competitive power markets in the belief that it would ultimate result in lower prices to 
consumers.  Although deregulation did stimulate new power plant construction, 
especially of renewable power plants, it required fundamental changes in the way the 
power system was operated, both to allow non-utility owned generators to use the system, 
but also to track use of the system by all generators.  As a result, market mechanisms 
were adopted to allocate costs among all generators.  These costs were then used to price 
the power that each generator supplied to its customers, wholesale or retail.   
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In competitive markets, power prices are set through an auction-like process that settles 
on a single price that satisfies the needs of buyers and sellers.  This price is the highest 
price acceptable to the buyers and sellers at the time and is called the “market clearing 
price.”  Establishing prices this way is called “marginal cost pricing” because all bidders 
are paid the same price (the market clearing price) irrespective of their bid.  Bidders with 
low costs compared to the market clearing price make large profits.  Profits are used to 
pay off the fixed costs of plant ownership, either new plant construction costs, or the cost 
of power plants purchased from others.  The introduction of competitive power markets 
makes it no longer possible to simply allocate actual generation and transmission costs 
across all customers.  Instead, power bills need to reflect the price each customer, or its 
representative, pays for power from specific generators and for use of the power grid.   
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Competitive Market Realities for Renewables 
 
Competitive power markets allow buyers to choose among supply sources.  This has 
enabled development of renewable power projects to serve the needs of customers who 
have a requirement for power from renewables.  It also allows customers to negotiate 
power prices for the duration of a contract, be that very short term, or over multiple years. 
 
Competitive market structures favor power producers with plants that have both low 
fixed costs and low fuel and O&M costs.  In contrast, renewable power projects have 
high fixed costs and low O&M costs.  Because profits from competitive power sales are 
used to repay construction costs, competitive markets are not well suited to the financing 
requirements of renewable project developers because they require secure profits to retire 
financing costs for a long period of time.  This can provide an opportunity for buyers to 
negotiate long-term supply contracts with renewable power project developers on 
favorable terms, including terms that fix prices over the duration of the contract.  This 
helps insulate the customer from future power price increases.  Government agencies 
typically have long-term power requirements and can benefit from the budget stability a 
fixed power price provides.  However, governmental agencies require reliable power, 
which some renewable resources do not provide.        
 
Wholesale power buyers purchase power from a variety of sources including potentially 
renewable resources.  They also trade power in various “spot” markets.  As a result, they 
are able to sell reliable power to retail customers by drawing on a portfolio of generation 
to meet the specific needs of each customer.  A retail customer that wants to rely on 
renewable power has to be able to duplicate this process, because it has to match its 
unique demand with the output of specific generating resources and/or markets.  If it 
purchases too little, it runs the risk of a power outage.  If it purchases too much, it wastes 
money.  To strike the right balance, a retail customer needs to procure a set amount of 
power from a renewable resource and have in place a process to match that resource with 
actual power demand using available power markets.  In other words, a retail purchase of 
renewable power requires two components: a renewable power supply contract and a 
power marketing contract that can be used to match renewable generation output to real-
time demand by trading in wholesale power markets.   
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Matching Renewable Energy and Load Requirements 
 
Assume a customer wants to purchase 10 MW of power for every hour in a year.  In 
terms of the power market, this is called a 10-MW “block”.  A 10-MW wind farm 
could supply power only when the wind blows, which is roughly 33% of the time.  
For a wind farm to meet these terms, it would have to provide power from some other 
source for the remaining 66% of the block.   Because the wind farm owner has no 
idea exactly when the wind will blow, the customer has no idea when it will have to 
purchase power from the market.  That makes it very difficult to enter into a 
comparable long-term contract with a conventional power supplier for a fixed price.  
Instead, it is forced to purchase power as needed from the “spot” market at prevailing 
prices, including during market peaks.  The wind farm can hedge some of these risks 
by over-producing and using the revenues from producing in excess of the 10-MW 
contract amount to offset the cost of market purchases when the wind isn’t blowing.  
For example, the farm could supply 100% of the contract requirements from a 30-
MW wind farm (recall wind farms only produce power about one third of the time, so 
a 30-MW farm is needed to provide an average of 10 MWs).  The wind farm supplies 
all of its output to meet the contract terms up to 10 MWs.  When more power is 
available, it is sold into the spot market and the revenues earned from those sales are 
used to offset the costs from spot market purchases when output is less than 10 MWs.  
This situation is illustrated in Figure 1.  As this figure shows, the benefit the 
renewable power producer enjoys by not having fuel costs gets diluted when it tries to 
sell power directly to a customer, instead of into the market at prevailing market 
prices.  Similarly, when it tries to deliver 100% renewable power to a customer, the 
transaction requires the skills of a power marketer to trade in and out of the 
competitive market; skills many renewable resource developers lack. 
 
 
Figure 1: Lack of correlation between wind turbine output and load requirements. 
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Renewable Power, Markets, and Federal Goals 
 
Renewable power can be priced at a fixed price on a long-term contract because 
renewable power projects have no fuel costs. In essence, the cost includes the price of 
“fuel” for the life of the project.  This “fuel price” is part of the project’s financing.  
Again, it is as if you are paying for a lifetime of “fuel” upfront.  Consequently, renewable 
power is typically more expensive initially than conventional power.  As a result, it 
typically requires a long-term power supply contract to secure construction financing.    
 
Because renewable power is not cheaper than most conventional power sources, at least 
on a first-cost basis, there are two basic sources of demand for renewable power today; 
the voluntary and compliance markets.  The voluntary market is older and provides an 
environmentally preferable power source for utilities and firms that want to reduce 
reliance on conventional power resources and their associated environmental impacts.  
This includes enlightened utilities that see renewables as a resource with the lowest life-
cycle cost and therefore, preferable to conventional power plants.  The voluntary market 
has been eclipsed by the “compliance” market, which is sustained by renewable resource 
content requirements imposed on utilities and retail power providers by state regulators 
and/or legislatures.  Typically, these take the form of renewable portfolio standards, or 
RPSs.  An RPS mandates that covered entities provide a specific fraction or amount of 
power from specific renewable resources.  Over half of the states have adopted some 
form of RPS to date. 
 
Federal agencies are one of the earliest and largest participants in compliance markets as 
a result of legislative requirements and Executive Orders dating to the 1970s.  Most 
recently, requirements in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (Public Law 109-58) and 
Executive Order 13423 (72 FR 3919-3923) represent the primary Federal drivers.  The 
purpose of these requirements is to stimulate renewable power development above and 
beyond that directed by compliance markets, especially through development of 
renewable potential on Federal and Indian lands for use by Federal agencies.  Renewable 
power purchases and RECs can be procured for both voluntary and compliance markets, 
although certain criteria may be applied for resources that are certified for these markets.  
Most RPS markets require actual renewable power purchased, rather than purchase of 
RECs.  Typically, these purchases have to be within a specific geographic area, and at 
minimum, within the regional transmission grid.   
 
Use of voluntary markets by Federal agencies or other retail customers must confront the 
difference between a renewable power purchase and a REC.  This is largely because 
retail customers do not have the same access to wholesale power markets and 
transmission as do power retailers and marketers.  For a consumer to purchase renewable 
power, the renewable resource has to be part of the same “closed” electrical grid as the 
consumer.  Otherwise the power cannot be delivered to the customer.  The price the 
consumer pays for the renewable power will have to include the cost of the power itself 
and the costs for using the power grid to get the power to the consumer, including the 
costs incurred to match the output from the renewable power project to the customer 
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(transmission, firming, shaping, ancillary services, and other reliability reserves).  As 
noted previously, this type of transaction typically requires two parties; the renewable 
power producer and a power marketer to handle power delivery and associated reliability 
services.  A REC is created when a renewable power producer sells “commodity power” 
into the competitive market for the prevailing power price and splits off the 
environmental attributes to form the REC.  The REC for that power trades independently 
of where the power goes once it enters the grid.  Consequently, the REC represents the 
premium associated only with the renewable resource and not the additional costs of 
transmission and associated services to deliver power to specific customers.  As a result, 
RECs are easier to contract for, and can be cheaper when all costs are considered.  They 
are also “footloose,” meaning they can be produced anywhere, irrespective of regional 
transmission grid boundaries. 
 
RECs are also purchased voluntarily by individuals, businesses, and institutions to meet 
their individual environmental goals.  In contrast to compliance markets for RECs (to 
meet RPS mandates), voluntary RECs can have widely varying characteristics in terms of 
location of the power resource, renewable resource type and age, and date of REC 
production.  Accordingly, Federal agencies need to purchase RECs that are consistent 
with current guidance regarding resource location, type, and age to ensure their efforts 
meet Federal and agency renewable and other energy goals.  Similar care must also be 
taken for renewable power purchases. 
 
Although voluntary REC purchases initially stimulated development of new renewable 
resources, it is more likely that current RPS mandates facilitate a parallel voluntary REC 
market on its margin as a result of the much large size of the RPS market.  The reason for 
this is simple.  An RPS creates a demand for renewables that must be satisfied by the 
covered entities, whereas the voluntary market is subject to the whims (and budgets) of 
consumers that are not compelled to purchase RECs.  As a result, the voluntary market 
may not stimulate significant new renewable resource development because it doesn’t 
provide sufficient assurance to renewable developers that they will be able to recover 
their costs.  That said, the voluntary market has proven itself over the years and continues 
to grow.  Therefore, it may be possible to provide long-term financial assurances if a 
“forward” market in RECs develops.   
 
Forward markets consist of futures and options contracts that allow buyers and sellers to 
fix prices for commodities in the future.  In general, formal forward markets are created 
by financial institutions once a robust commodity market is established.  A case in point 
is the Texas compliance market, which is primarily implemented through a REC market. 
The Texas transmission operator manages the Texas REC market, which is open to REC 
buyers from anywhere, including retail customers who want to purchase RECs 
voluntarily.  To date, the Texas approach has stimulated the largest amount of renewable 
generation development in the Nation, so this approach appears to work well.  Other 
states with RPS requirements have interest in adopting a similar model, including 
California and states in the Pennsylvania, Jersey, Maryland Interconnection (PJM), which 
also includes the District of Columbia and Delaware.  This approach works in these areas 
because the RECs must come from generating sources within the local interconnection.  
  9
In other words, as long as the RECs originate from the same closed transmission grid, the 
exact location of the generation or buyer is not important because the renewable resource 
acts to displace conventional generation that would otherwise be required to meet 
demand.  As a result, the RPS creates an assured market for RECs into the future, which 
appears to be satisfactory for developers to arrange long-term financing.  As this practice 
spreads, or if a national RPS is adopted, it may stimulate development of a more stable 
environment for financing renewable power projects that do not have a long-term sales 
agreement in place.   
 
In the interim, it may be possible to accomplish the same goal, namely renewable power 
price stability, via a REC hedge agreement.  In this scenario, RECs could be purchased in 
advance from projects under construction.  This “forward” purchase would provide the 
developer with financial assurances it could use to facilitate more favorable financing 
terms, while the REC buyer would obtain a potentially more favorable fixed REC price.  
If the REC price was indeed favorable, that REC could be sold for the prevailing power 
price and the additional revenues could be applied to the actual power bill.  This scenario 
borders on speculation, which Federal agencies cannot engage in.  However, if the intent 
was to hold the RECs rather than to sell them, and at some future time the RECs became 
a fungible asset that was better used to cover current expenses, which would appear to 
avoid their use as vehicles for speculation.  Of course, sale of the RECs would negate 
their value for meeting current and future renewable energy goals.   
 
In summary, Federal agencies have renewable energy goals that current guidance allows 
to be satisfied through on-site projects, renewable power purchases, or purchase of RECs.  
Of these, on-site projects and renewable power purchases provide physical power to the 
site and may provide price and budget certainty depending on the nature and duration of 
the contract.  Many states have adopted renewable portfolio standards.  An RPS 
stimulates development of renewable resources, typically within the states or nearby.  It 
also stimulates interest in development of renewable resource potential on Federal lands 
and facilitates the development and sale of power from projects that are being developed 
to meet the RPS but could, instead, be purchased by Federal agencies.  Federal entities 
are only able to purchase renewable power directly from the producer if they are in a 
deregulated state, or if the producer is the serving utility.  Purchases directly from a 
producer do not ensure reliable power delivery comparable to that of the utility or other 
conventional power providers.  Many renewable resources cannot produce power so that 
it exactly matches the use of a prospective Federal customer.  As a result, the customer 
will require the services of a power marketer or similar service to manage the output from 
the renewable power resource and the customer’s demand using competitive power 
markets and conventional power sources.  On the other hand, Federal entities are free to 
purchase RECs anywhere and do no require any additional services.  However, RECs are 
unlikely to provide an agency with the price stability and budget certainty a long-term 
renewable power purchase agreement can provide.
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What Options are Available to Retail Customers in Non-deregulated 
Areas 
 
Customers in areas that have not deregulated have more limited options than customers in 
states with competitive retail markets.  One option that may be available is participating 
in a utility green pricing program.  Green pricing is an optional utility service that allows 
customers to support a greater level of utility company investment in renewable energy 
technologies. Participating customers pay a premium on their electric bills to cover the 
incremental cost of the additional renewable energy. To date, more than 600 utilities, 
including investor-owned, municipal utilities, and cooperatives, offer a green pricing 
option. One advantage to Federal agencies of participating in utility green pricing 
programs is that it may be procured on a sole source basis from the local utility with the 
premium included as an added line item on the utility bill.  Additionally, local utility 
green pricing programs often directly support the development new renewable generation 
resources in the local area.  However, the quality and costs of the programs varies greatly 
and the programs are often considerably more expensive than competitive power 
procurements or the purchase of RECs.  Another option that is emerging is negotiation 
between the Federal agency and the serving utility for a special renewable power supply 
option.  Typically this requires a new tariff and/or modification of current utility service 
agreements.  It also usually costs more for the renewable portion of the power supply.  
The decision whether or not to support a local utility program must be done on a case-by-
case basis based on the quality of the program, the additional costs and budget available 
and the objectives of the agency. 
  11
Federal Renewable Goals, Acquisition Barriers, and Potential Solutions 
 
Federal agencies have been directed to use some renewable energy for over a decade, as 
is evident in Executive Order 13123, now replaced by Executive Order 13423 (72 FR 
3919-3923).  A Federal renewable requirement is also included in the Energy Policy Act 
of 2005 (42 USC 15852 as amended).   While progress has been made, limited access to 
renewable power and ineffective market structures in deregulated states has posed 
barriers to renewable power procurements.  Both renewable resource availability and 
access to it through tariffs or markets are necessary for agencies to make significant 
progress, but neither alone is sufficient if appropriate budgets, acquisition authorities, and 
agency directives to procure renewable power are not in place.  As a result, a majority of 
agencies currently rely on purchasing RECs to meet their renewable energy objectives.  
Renewable power purchases, in the form of power purchase agreements (PPAs) or other 
mechanisms, may be more beneficial than RECs because they often ensure a predictable 
price for renewable power for a long term, thereby stabilizing power costs and increasing 
budget certainty.  Life-cycle cost (LCC) directs agencies to consider such agreements 
even if they are more expensive today, so long as they provide a lower cost over the life 
of the contract.  This section reviews the environment within which Federal agencies 
consider renewable power procurement. 
 
Acquisition Authorities 
 
The authorities for purchasing renewable power are the same as those for purchases of 
power from conventional sources, namely the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR; 48 
CFR 1) and Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations (DFAR; 48 CFR 2).  At present, 
electricity is treated differently in the FAR and DFAR depending on whether it is 
purchased as a “commodity” or a “utility service.”  This distinction was unimportant 
prior to deregulation because all electricity in a given service area was governed by a 
single provider and delivered as a utility service.  As deregulation has become more 
widespread, this distinction, while inexact, has gained in importance.  Accordingly, 
customary interpretations differ from agency to agency, as well as within the Department 
of Defense (DOD) among the services.  Typically, a utility service includes power and 
delivery bundled into a single product and based on standardized prices and terms of 
service.  Based on the previous discussion, this would include the purchase of power and 
its delivery to the agency as a single transaction. 
 
Deregulation “unbundled” standard utility service into two components, standard utility 
service for power delivery that is only available from the local utility, and commodity 
power that can be purchased from competitive suppliers.  In the FAR and DFAR, contract 
terms for commodities are limited to 5 years, while utility service contracts are limited to 
10.  There are exceptions to these authorities for Federal customers of a Federal power 
marketing authority (PMA), such as the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) or 
Western Area Power Administration (WAPA), and for DOD.  Other exceptions may exist 
as well.  Referring to previous discussions of how power markets work, a renewable 
power contract essentially re-bundles the purchase of power from a renewable resource 
(arguably a “commodity”) with the specific delivery services necessary to match output 
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from the renewable resource to the loads of the customer in accordance with applicable 
utility regulations.  In other words, a deregulated customer may purchase “system mix” 
power from a competitive power market provider as a commodity, because the power 
marketer can supply this demand from a portfolio of resources without regard to the 
source or cost of each.  However, renewable power must be purchased as a bundled 
product, which more closely resembles a utility service, because the renewable power has 
a specific source that needs to be supplemented with conventional resources and 
delivered to a specific customer location.  It is no wonder procurement professionals, 
who are not utility professionals, get confused! 
 
The two major issues facing Federal agencies trying to purchase renewable power are 
getting the price down to a reasonable level and determining the applicable acquisition 
authorities sufficient to not only do so, but to actually attract a supplier.  Given the 
financial hurdles presented, these issues are usually too much to overcome.  Attracting a 
reasonably priced supply offer most likely requires a contract term that is long enough to 
cover the debt repayment period, typically 10 to 15 years.  Moreover, the bulk of the 
economic benefits from such a contract typically accrue after the debt repayment period.  
As a result, a 15-year contract term would allow a renewable project developer to finance 
its project based on charging the Federal agency a premium price.  Then, after the 
contract ended, the developer would be able to earn windfall profits on the resource the 
agency’s contract paid for.  Accordingly, the ideal contract length should be long enough 
for the agency to get the advantages of lower power costs after the debt repayment 
period, typically 25 to 30 years.   
 
One exception to the FAR and DFAR is a PMA contract.  PMAs are Federal entities that 
operate as a utility and have the authority to enter into contracts consistent with utility 
practice.  Their authority also allows them to offer their customers, including Federal 
customers, 20-year or longer supply contracts.  However, PMA power supply contracts 
are often limited to available resources.  Once these are exhausted, the PMA has to 
supplement their resources with purchases from wholesale power markets and other 
sources.  Most of the PMAs’ Federal customers are DOD facilities.  DOD has been 
working with two PMAs, BPA and WAPA, to provide supplemental power from 
renewable resources rather than “system mix” purchases from wholesale markets.  It was 
successful working with WAPA to provide 100% renewable power for Edwards Air 
Force Base, but has been unsuccessful in other transactions.  This is primarily a result of 
uncertainties in the conventional power market and supplier inability to provide 
reasonable indications of prices to firm and shape renewable power supplies.  Although 
the PMAs serve a number of large Federal customers, primarily in the West, they are not 
generally accepting new Federal power supply customers.  Nevertheless, WAPA has 
been willing to provide power procurement services under the FAR subpart 17.5, general 
referred to as the Economy Act (31 USC 1535), to non-WAPA Federal customers that are 
in the WAPA service area and are eligible to purchase power from competitive suppliers.   
WAPA has also been willing to offer power procurement services to facilitate 
development of on-site power projects, as described in a subsequent section. 
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DOD itself is the second exception because it has the authority under 10 USC 2922 (a) 
(formerly 10 USC 2394) to enter into contracts up to 30 years in length for power from 
“energy facilities.”  However, it is restricted under 40 USC 591 (formerly section 8093 of 
the Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1988, Public Law 100-202) to 
transactions that are consistent with state utility regulations.  In other words, it cannot be 
used to bypass service provided by regulated utilities unless state law allows retail choice.  
The Economy Act (31 USC 1535) allows non-DOD Federal facilities to piggy back on 
DOD contracts using this authority, although contract terms for those agencies would 
have to be consistent with authorities applicable to them under the FAR.  In other words, 
if DOD had a 30-year contract under 10 USC 2922 (a), a non-DOD Federal facility may 
be restricted to a 10-year term as a “utility service” under the FAR.  DOD also has special 
authority to purchase power from geothermal power projects developed on its lands, but 
this authority cannot be extended to other sources, sites or agencies.   
 
 
 
To date, DOD has not used 10 USC 2394 or 10 USC 2922 (a) to enter into long-term 
power purchase agreements for renewable power.  The lack of precedent is a major 
reason why this authority has not been used.  Committing an agency to longer term 
contracts is risky and thus far, procurement professionals have been reluctant to do so.  
Their reasons are many and varied.  One of the major stumbling blocks is inherent to the 
“ideal” renewable power contract model.  As discussed, the best terms appear to be 
available by entering into a contract with a developer needing a power purchase contract 
to obtain construction financing.  In other words, the contract is a promise to provide 
power from an as yet unbuilt project.  There are limits to how far in advance the 
government can enter into contracts for future delivery of products and services.  This 
also raises questions about how to pick a “winner.”  To comply with Federal procurement 
requirements (10 USC 2922 (a) and 41 USC 253), the procurement should be 
competitive, which opens the door to offers from proposers and projects that may not be 
equal.  Unfortunately, most procurement professionals feel (and are) unqualified to assess 
the merits of such proposals.  Similarly, the power supply has to be synchronized with the 
current supplier’s contract termination.  What happens if the new provider’s project isn’t 
operational when the current contract ends?  Finally, what is the government cost 
Case study 1 – Advantages of Long-term Power Purchase Agreements 
   
A military facility had an opportunity to purchase a large amount of power from a 
proposed wind farm.  The Federal purchase contract would have enabled the project 
developer to obtain the necessary bank financing for a project that was permitted 
and ready to go.  The underlying financing provided for power costs was to be fixed 
at roughly 5 cents/kWh for the first 10 years, and then decreased to 4.5 cents for the 
next 5.  Both equity investors and the bank loan would have been repaid after 15 
years, and the power cost would have dropped to the cost of ongoing O&M, 
expected to be between 1.5 and 2 cents/kWh (in 2020!).  The simple average power 
costs for 10 years would be 5 cents, for 15 it would be 4.83, but for the 30-year 
expected project life, only 3.1 cents!  In this case, as with most, a 30-year contract 
would be more beneficial to the government.  Unfortunately, most agencies cannot 
enter into such long-term contracts, with two exceptions noted.
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estimate for a project like this?  That requires a projection of future power costs, which 
does not exist and would be imperfect if it did.  Available projections are not site specific 
enough to answer this question, and none extend out to the 30 plus years needed for the 
economic analysis.  The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
determined that LCC procedures are also inadequate for markets that are as volatile as 
energy and power markets have been and are likely to be into the future.  Similarly, 
although the renewable power price can be forecasted with some precision, the necessary 
firming, shaping, and other services cannot.  This point can be illustrated using the wind 
farm example cited previously (Figure 1).  Finally, use of 10 USC 2922 (a) requires 
approval of the Secretary of Defense (SecDef).  This means a contract will need to pass 
up the chain-of-command within a Service, through the Service Secretary, and then on to 
the SecDef.  According to an Army general, decisions for SecDef approval pass through 
over 20 inboxes before they reach the SecDef.  Because energy contracts are often time 
sensitive (many price offers expire within a day), this process may be too unwieldy to be 
effective. 
 
On-site Renewable Project Development 
 
Development of on-site energy resources presents its own issues.  Renewable power 
projects enjoy significant tax-based Federal and state financial incentives that are not 
available to Federal agencies that develop projects with appropriated funds.  In addition, 
appropriated funds are not generally available for renewable projects and certainly not in 
quantities needed to develop much of the available resources.  For example, a recent 
DOD assessment of wind, solar, and geothermal potential on DOD lands estimated (U.S. 
DOD 2005) billions of dollars would be required to develop projects expected to be cost-
effective today.  Further, construction and operation of renewable power projects is not a 
core mission for any Federal agency, other than some of the PMAs.  As a result, these 
resources are best owned and operated by third parties on land leased from the 
government, with the power being sold directly to the agency.  This approach permits 
private parties to benefit from tax-based and other incentives, protects the agency from 
project performance risk, and ensures proper maintenance of the facility on an on-going 
basis.   
 
There are several mechanisms for implementing a third-party ownership model, although 
most still require some kind of PPA.  Any third party use of Federal assets, including land 
or rooftops for renewable power projects, requires a real estate transaction.  There are 
several mechanisms that facilitate use of real-estate including a lease, an easement, and a 
franchise.  A lease is the most secure mechanism for a prospective power project 
developer because it provides the strongest assurance to the developer and its financial 
partners of access to the site on a continuing basis, and for termination rights in case such 
access is denied.  Many project financiers want a lease agreement as a loan condition.  
The transaction that is most familiar to power project developers is a lease combined with 
a PPA.  Federal procurement regulations prohibit “connecting” the PPA and the lease.  
Accordingly, each needs to be executed separately, although that may done 
simultaneously.   
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Case study 2 – The Economics of Wind Farms 
 
In the case of the wind farm proposal, future renewable power costs could be 
estimated fairly precisely because the majority of wind farm costs are fixed costs 
based on construction and financing costs that are well known at the time an offer is 
submitted.  Turning power from a wind farm into reliable power requires power 
purchases from available power and transmission markets contemporaneously.  
Although “futures” markets can be used to estimate these costs, those markets extend 
no further than 5 years into the future and estimates beyond 12-18 months are highly 
volatile.  Firm pricing for transmission and related services is largely unavailable.  
Consequently, the wind farm offer was based on an estimate using projected wind 
farm costs and costs the previous year for market services.  That was deemed 
appropriate because the alternative to the wind farm proposal was simply market 
prices.  In other words, the primary unknown was the same in the wind farm case and 
the conventional power case, namely future market prices.  This raised another 
procurement issue.  As noted at the beginning of this section, renewable power itself is 
a type of commodity, but the delivery of the power is a service.  As this discussion 
indicates, the vendor could provide a firm price for the renewable power commodity 
for 30 years, but couldn’t do so for the delivery and other services for more than 5.  A 
30-year renewable power contract has no value to a retail customer unless it is 
bundled with the delivery service.  A utility service however is a “service” under the 
FAR and DFAR, and can’t be contracted for a 30-year period.  A legal opinion 
determined that 10 USC 2394 covered the entire set of transactions.  Nevertheless, the 
fact that a comparable 30-year price quote could not be obtained for the delivery 
services troubled the procurement staff.  Potentially, this could have been resolved by 
awarding the contract with a provision to recompete the service component, but the 
process never got that far.   
 
In this analysis, the economic risks of the wind farm offer were less than with the 
business-as-usual approach of purchasing from an uncertain and volatile market.  
There was, however, one exception, and that was if future market rules changed in 
such a way to disadvantage wind power compared to conventional supplies.  As it 
turns out, that is exactly what happened.  Of course, these conditions could reverse 
just as easily, but the lack of certainty and the complexities of the market make 
procurement professionals nervous about long-term contracts.  Delays in responding 
to the wind farm offer (over 1 year thus far) have also resulted in significant upward 
revisions in the renewable power price.  The initial price offer was fixed based on 
wind turbine prices current at the time.  Had the government accepted the offer, these 
prices would have been guaranteed.  Instead, while the facility dithered, turbine prices 
increased nearly 100%.   
 
This proposal was also evaluated to supply General Services Administration (GSA) 
loads.  While the initial proposal was less expensive for military loads, it was more 
expensive for GSA loads.  The difference resided primarily on the fact GSA loads are 
“8-to-5” weekdays, whereas military loads are “24-7.”  Because the wind doesn’t 
blow on an 8-to-5 schedule, the benefits are greater for loads that are more constant. 
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Another option is a simple lease with a proviso that the agency “may” exercise an option 
to procure power from any project that results.  This allows development to be planned 
based on a sale into the competitive power market with an option for the Federal entity to 
purchase power if the terms and conditions are acceptable.  This type of transaction is 
sometimes referred to as a public-private venture (PPV), although in reality that term has 
much broader application, including the lease/PPA arrangement described previously.  
One of the most successful leases in the Federal sector is the Navy lease of land for 
geothermal power development at China Lake in California.  This project resulted in 
passage of special legislation (section 803 of Public Law 95-356) that grants DOD the 
authority to enter into similar agreements on DOD lands specifically for geothermal 
power project development.  This authority allows DOD to negotiate royalties in lieu of a 
lease, with those royalties dedicated to funding energy projects in DOD.   
 
The final major mechanism is an enhanced use lease (EUL).  Although provisions for 
EULs vary among agencies, they typically allow a lease of government assets in 
exchange for an in-kind contribution in lieu of a lease payment.  For example, a local 
university may lease land to construct training facilities on Federal land.  In exchange, the 
Federal facility may get free use of a portion of these facilities.  This mechanism has been 
used by several agencies to develop central heating, cooling, and/or generating facilities 
that provided heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) or other services to 
adjacent non-agency properties.  This allows the development of facilities that are 
optimally sized, but larger than needed for the Federal facility.  The benefit to the 
government is lower service costs.   
 
One of the major benefits of on-site resource development is that it does not require 
firming, shaping, and transmission services if the power is all used on-site (it may if the 
power ever flows off-site).  However, displacement of purchased power by on-site 
projects may trigger new utility rate clauses.  Not only can the utility charge for back-up 
and standby power, the reduced consumption may push the customer into a lower use, 
higher cost rate class.  Another advantage of on-site projects is they are “behind the 
meter” and are competing with retail rather than wholesale prices.  Retail prices are 
higher than wholesale prices. For Federal agencies this may represent a way to “fix” a 
significant portion of their utility bill at reasonable cost and avoid the market volatility 
previously discussed.  Unfortunately, power sales to agencies from on-site projects may 
violate state prohibitions against sales of power to retail customers by non-utilities.  This 
risk has to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.  
   
Budget Adequacy and Certainty 
  
A number of budget concerns trouble Federal procurement staff as well.  Long-term 
contracts can create future year payment obligations that the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) would “score” as a current year expense.  Fortunately, this is an issue that 
agencies have had to confront with respect to current multi-year power and natural gas 
supply contracts.  Typically these contracts have explicit termination and damage 
provisions that limit the government’s financial risk to the difference between the 
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contract rate and prevailing power prices.  The industry finds these terms to be 
acceptable, and they appear to address OMB concerns.  
 
Another factor that weighs heavily on the process is the lack of adequate energy budgets 
and budget certainty.  Recent energy prices have increased faster than the inflation rate 
allowed in utility budgets.  Some agencies deliberately underfund the utility budget 
believing it provides an incentive for facility managers to conserve.  Understandably, 
procurement professionals are reluctant to enter into long-term contracts even when 
current budgets are inadequate because this obligates the agency to an expense it is 
currently not budgeted for.  Fortunately, once a long-term contract is executed, the 
agency is forced to budget for it.  An unusual twist on this concern occurs during 
continuing resolutions when budget authority is limited to weeks or months at best.  One 
DOD renewable power transaction fell apart because the contract could not be issued 
while the procurement agent, a PMA, was under the restraints of a continuing resolution.  
Although the agency had authority to enter into multi-year budgets, it did not have the 
budgetary authority to enter into obligations that exceeded its current budgetary authority, 
namely the duration of the continuing resolution.     
 
A final issue has to do with what qualifies as a utility expense.  Some agencies have 
determined that RECs are not a utility expense because they do not actually provide 
“electrical service.”  As a result, they claim funding for REC purchases cannot come 
from the “utility” account.  This seems at odds with how RECs are discussed in executive 
orders and the Administration’s renewable guidance documents.  Nevertheless, this is 
another issue that needs to be addressed. 
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Summary, Observations and Conclusions 
 
To recap: 
 
• All Federal agencies can purchase renewable power as a “commodity” on a 5-year 
contract if they are in deregulated states.   
 
• All Federal agencies can purchase renewable power as a “utility service” on a 10-
year contract if such service is available from a “utility.”  The utility definition 
has been extended to include retail power providers in deregulated markets by 
some agencies.   
 
• All Federal agency customers of PMAs may be able to obtain renewable power 
on contracts as long as 30 years from their PMA supplier if the PMA is willing to 
do so.  Not all PMAs are willing to accommodate these requests, and each has to 
be dealt with on a case-by-case basis.  Typically, the Federal agency would only 
ask the PMA to procure renewable power for its “supplemental” (non-PMA) 
power requirements to preserve the maximum benefit of low-cost PMA power. 
 
• Federal customers in the “footprint” of a PMA may be able to request power 
procurement services from a PMA under the Economy Act (31 USC 1535) if the 
PMA is willing and the customer is eligible for retail choice, retail wheeling, or a 
wholesale customer under state and Federal regulations. 
 
• PMAs may, acting under the Economy Act (31 USC 1535), procure power from 
power projects on Federal facilities using their long-term contracting authority, as 
long as the entity is within the PMA’s “footprint.” 
 
• PMAs may, acting under the Economy Act (31 USC 1535), procure RECs for 
Federal facilities in the U.S. 
 
• DOD facilities may procure power for up to 30 years, using authority in 10 USC 
2922 (a) (formerly 10 USC 2394), if the facility is allowed to procure power from 
competitive power markets under state and Federal regulations.  DOD facilities 
may use this authority for power purchased from on-site projects as well. 
 
• Non-DOD Federal agencies may be able to piggy-back on a long-term DOD 
renewable power contract under the Economy Act (31 USC 1535), as long as the 
facility is allowed to procure power from competitive power markets under state 
and Federal regulations.  The resulting contract must also conform to the 
customer agency’s procurement regulations regarding contract type, utility versus 
commodity, and length.   
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Furthermore, 
 
• Long-term contracts (15 to 30 years) provide Federal customers with the best 
opportunity to minimize renewable power price premiums, if any. 
 
• Long-term contacts can be structured such that renewable power prices decline 
significantly over time. 
 
• Obtaining favorable pricing will likely depend on partnering with a developer of a 
project that has been permitted, but lacks financing.  As a result, the contract may 
not provide renewable power initially and the customer may have to bear some 
performance risk (that the project won’t be completed or won’t produce power) 
that could result in a recompetition. 
 
• Prospective development partners will probably require a contract for a large 
amount of power given the scale of most renewable power projects. To cite an 
example, bids to install a single large turbine were two times the average cost 
quoted by industry for a wind farm of 60 MW or larger.   
 
• Renewable power obtained through physical contracts that require delivery of 
power to specific customer delivery points are complicated because they require 
arrangements for transmission and reliability reserves at a minimum, which will 
increase costs and may not be available on the same terms (duration) as the 
renewable power contract.  In addition, many renewable resources are intermittent 
and require supplementation with other resources to firm and shape the power to 
match the customer’s actual power usage.  The price for these services in the 
future is uncertain and therefore difficult, if not impossible, to fix in a long-term 
contract.   
 
• It is unlikely that the renewable power provider will want to provide the necessary 
firming, shaping, and reliability reserve services the customer needs for reliable 
power.  Accordingly, these services may have to be provided by another vendor. 
 
Given this summary, why has the acquisition of renewable power proceeded so slowly?  
With few exceptions, energy procurement decisions are delegated to very low levels in 
most organizations.  The goal of this report is to illustrate the complexities involved in 
procuring renewable power for Federal agencies.  Contracting staff that procure energy, 
let alone renewable power, are often untutored in these complexities.  A different 
procurement staff is frequently assigned to each new contract, frustrating attempts to 
educate them.  It follows that training a core of procurement professionals could alleviate 
many of the problems that are slowing progress today.  This may require centralization of 
energy procurement activities in proximity to a staff of utility professionals, such that 
staff become educated in executing renewable power contracts and have room to 
innovative.   
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Clarification of long-term contracting authorities is needed within DOD to facilitate use 
of authorities under 10 USC 2922 (a), and Federal agencies should be more aggressive 
about challenging utilities that do not provide reasonable access to affordable renewable 
power consistent with the provisions of 40 USC 591.  GSA is the procurement agent for 
all Federal agencies, although it has delegated energy procurement authority to the 
Departments of Defense and Energy.  GSA has a well trained energy procurement staff, 
and should therefore be provided with authority similar to 10 USC 2922 (a) to procure 
renewable power on behalf of its remaining customer agencies, which at times have 
included individual DOD and DOE facilities.   
 
This document focused on renewable power purchasing in part because it is assumed 
renewable power purchases are the best way to stimulate additional new renewable 
resource development. However, as the discussion of the power system hopefully made 
clear, there is little difference between renewable power and a REC if they both come 
from resources located in the same “closed” transmission grid.  The report should also 
have made it clear that purchasing renewable power is extremely complicated.  It may be 
possible for large customers to execute contracts for delivery of power from renewable 
projects, but the costs and complexities for small customers are often considered not 
worth the hassle.  There may be ways to reform how RECs are purchased to achieve the 
stimulative effects of renewable power purchases.  For example, long-term contracts for 
RECs from unbuilt projects could be used to help secure project financing.  Admittedly 
this does not provide the same fixed energy price a renewable power contract would, but 
it would reduce complexity and the requirement of a large scale purchase, which opens it 
up to smaller Federal facilities. 
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